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rSac. No. 5838. In Bank.

Feb. 21>. 1049.1

MADGE EBERT et a1., Respondents, v. STATE OF
CALIFORNIA et aI., Appellants.
[1] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property.-,.When an estlltE'
consisting solely of money and intangible personal property
is distributed to the state pursullnt to Prob. Code, § 102'1",
declaring that the property so distributed "shall be held by
the State Treasurer for a period of five years from the date
of thci decree making such distribution, within which time
any person may appear . . . and claim the estate," the
period of limitation commences to run from the date of the
decree of distribution and not from the date of delivery of
the estate to the State Treasurer, since the word "held" as
quoted above refers to the right of such official to claim
possessioDof the property on bchnlf of the stnte, and docli
not import thnt he must be in actual posRes~ion thereof.
[2] Statutes-Repeal-Rule Against Repeal by Implication.-Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, and statutes
relating to the same subject are to be constrned together aud
.
harmonized if J¥lssible.
[3] Escheat-Claims to Escheatcd Property.-<:Ode Civ. Proe.,
I 1272a, declaring that the Superior Court of Sacramento
County shall have jurisdiction to determine claims to estates

[1] See llB Cal.Jur. 783; 23 Ca1.Jur. 758, 788; 50 Am.Jur. ::\fi8.
Melt. Dis. References: [1,3] Escheat, § 7; [2] Statutes, ~ 93.
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"when the estate ... bRS been rcct'jved by or deposited
with the State Treasurer" is Dot ineODtiistent with, nor docli
it repeal by implication the provision of Prob. Code, § 1027,
to the effect that that court shall have full and e:J:clusivtl
jurisdiction to determine claims to property distributed to
the state from the date of the decree of distribution.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Sacramento County. Peter J. Shields, Judge. Reversed.
Proceeding under Code Civ. Proc., § 1272a, to determine
title to property deposited with state Treasurer. Judgment for
petitioners reversed.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Gladys S. Burroughs,
E. G. Benard and William J. Power, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Appellants.
Brandenburger & White and William A. White for Respondents.
Henry F.Boyen and Frank J. Fontes as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-H. D. Coe died intestate on July 3, 1938,
and his estate was probated in the Superior Court for Butte
;, County. Since no h~irs appeared to claim the estate, the
: court on May 6, 1940, entered its decree ordering distribution
~'of the estate to the State of California pursuant to section
1 1027 of the Probate Code. The estate consisted of $7,181.40
lin cash 9n deposit with the Treasurer of Butte County and a
1~ claim for money against the California Almond Growers
~ Association. This claim was subsequently collected by the
fpublic administrator, and the money deposited with the
l1reasurer of Butte County. On August 14, 1945, the court
fente~ its order settling the administrator's slipplemental
#inal account and granting his petition for a supplement:tI
f- decree of distribution. The estate, amounting to $8,295.41
(on deposit with the Treasurer of Butte County, was not
f.-delivered to the StAte Treasurer until January 26, 1946,
' more than five years after the entry of the original decree.
:'~" , Respondents, whose relationship to decedent as first cousins
>~once removed is not disputed, made no claim or demand for
t~~e estate until the ins,titution of these proceedings on Feb13, 1946, pursuant to section 1272&' of the Code of
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Civil Procedure. Thnt section provides: "When the estatt'.
or any portion thereof, of any decedent has been receiveu
by or deposited with the State Treasurer pursuant to II
di~tribution thereof to the State of California . . . the superior
court of the county of Sacramento, State of California, shall
have full and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the title:
to the property and all claims thereto.
"AJJ.y person entitled to succeed to the property or to
take title thereto or possession thereof . . . may, unless otherwise barred, file a petition in the superior court of the county
of Sacramento showing his claim or right to the property ••.
"If, upon the trial of the issues, the court is satisfied of
claimant's right or title to the property claimed, it shall
grant him a certiticate to that effect under its seal. Upon
presentation of such certificate, the Oontroller shall draw his
warrant on the Treasurer for the amount of money covered
thereby•••• "
Judgment was entered that respondents share equally in
the estate and that the state make payment to tht:m accordingly. This appeal is taken from that judgment.
Appellants contend that any claims respondents may have
had to the estate are barred by section 1027 of. the Probate
Code, since the claims were not asserted until after five yearll
had elapsed from the date of the decree of distribution. Section
1027 of the Probate Code provides:
"If the money or other personal property belonging to
an estate has been deposited in the county treasury prior to
the date of distribution to the State of Oalifornia, upon the
rendition of the decree of distribution, any money 80 distributed shall forthwith
be delivered ·to -the State Treasurer
I
..
-.
by the County Treasurer, and all other personal property so
distributed shall forthwith be delivered to the State Controller
for deposit in the State treasury. • • •
"The property 80 distributed ,kaU be held by the State
Treasurer for ,. period of !ii/HI year, from the date of the
decree making suck di8tnoution, within which time any person
may appear in fhe superior court for the county of Sacra,.
mMJto a'tld claim the "tate or any part thereof. • •• Such
court s1uill have full and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the title to said property and all claims thereto. Any person
who does not appear and clnim, as herein required, shall be
forever barred, and such property, or so much thereof as is
BOt claimed, sh&ll vest absolutely in the State." (Italics added.)
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One basic question emerges from this appeal: When an
estate consisting solely of money and intangible personal property is distributed to the State of California pursuant to
section 1027 of the Probate Code, does the period of limitaf tion provided in that section commence to run from the date
of the decree of distribution, thus barring a claim filed more
f than five years after entry of the decree but within one month
t, after delivery of the estate to the State Treasurer!
F Section 1027 plainly states that one may claim an estate
at any time within the five-year period that the estate is
. "held by" the State Treasurer, and that this period shall
: commence to run from the date of the decree of distribution.
" Respondents contend, however, that an estate cannot be "held
" by" the State Treasurer until that official obtains physical
custody thereof, which he cannot do until some time after the
~:", date of the decree, so that the limitation period necessarily
, ' commences with the date upon which the estate is delivered
,~ to the State Treasurer.
~ [1] According to standard dictionaries, "As applif!d to
f- property, the word [held] is a technical one embracing two
~;" ideas, that of actual possession of some subject of dominion
or,', property, and that of being inl1esfed with legal titZe or right
, to hold or claim such possession." (Italics added~) (Ballentine,
Law Dict., 1930. See, also, Anderson's Diet. of Law, 1895,
I:, B,',lack'S Law Dict., 1933; 19 Words and Phrases 370, 372.)
~, ,Respondents adopt the first of these constructions, which makes
i'i," ,tile limitation prOvisi,0,n of section 1027 ambiguous. Under this
:( 'interpretation the express direction of the Legislature that
~the limitation period commences with the date of the decree is
;~ndered inoperative and another period is substituted in its
',: ),lace. Because of the explicit provision that the holding
,'period commences with the date of the decree, it is more rea:"~nable,to conclude that in using the term "held" the Legisla" ~ meant the right of the State Treasurer to claitn possl...'8Sion
<9f the property on behalf of the state, which is vested with
: '1~ title by virtue of the decree of distribution. By this
't~:~nstruction, effect is given to the section in its entirety, Imd
omissions and insertions are avoided. (See, Code Civ. Proc.,
t j 1858; County of Los Angeles v. Graves, 210 Cal. 21, 24
l~: [290 P. 444] ; I'll re Marque" 3 Ca1.2d 625, 629 [45 P.2d 342];
f~:.Wulff-Hansen If Co. v. S,7,vers, 21 Cal. 2d 253, 260 (131 P.2d
~.373]; People v. Moroney, 24 CRl.2d 638,643 [150 P.2d 888];
'f,eople v. Burns, 75 Cal.App. 84,88 r241 P~ 935] ; Marshall v.
~~WiZliams, 85 Cal.App. 507, 511-512 [259 P. 970] ; }'resno Cil1/
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B. S. Did. v. De OaNto, 33 Cal.App.2d 666, 672 [92 P.2d
668] ; 23 Cal.Jur. § 133, p. 758, § 134:, p. 760; 2 Sutherland.
Statutory Construction, § 4705, p. 339.)
Respondents contend, however, that since ~p.etion 1027
requires that any money distributed to the state be deliverl:d
forthwith to the State Treasurer, it necessarily follows that
the limitation period does not commence to run until :iuch
delivery is effected.
Upon its enactment in 1933 (Stats. 1933, p. 2362), III"C,
tion 1027 made no provision that estate assets on deposit
with the county treasurer be transmitted to the State TreDsurer. It was not until amendment of the section in 19:19
(Stats. 1939, p. 1448) that such a provision was added.
During the period from 1933 to 1939, the only requirement
that estate assets be delivered to the State Treasurer, when
there were no claimants thereto, was contained in section 1148
of the Probate Code, which provided: "After a final settlement of the estate, if there are. no heirs or other claimants
t.hereof, the county treasurer must pay into the state treasury
all moneys and effects in his hands belonging to the estate•
upon order of the court. •.. " (Italics added.) (Stats. 1931.
p. 662.) Until amendment of section 1027 in 1939 the provision that "the property so distributed shall be held by the
State Treasurer" could not have referred to property delivered to that official, for there was no correlation between
the date of the decree and the time within which delivery
was to be made. The State Treasurer must, therefore, be
considered as having held the estate even though not in actual
possession thereof. It can hardly be contended that by amending section 1027 in 1939 to require the immediate delivery
of certain estate assets, Ithe Legislature intended to provide
for a period of limitation different from that previously
established, for the wording of the limitation provision remained unchanged. (See, 23 Cal.Jur. § 154, p. 778, § 165,
p. 787; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §§ 1934, 1935,
pp. 430-434.) Furthermore, the section as amended requires
t.hat only money and personal property be delivered forthwith to the State Treasurer. There is no provision regarding
the dispositioB to be made of other estate assets such as real
property. Therefore, if respondents' argument were sound,
a claimant's right to claim real property would be barred
five years after the date of its distribution to the state, but
a claim to money or personal property could be al!8erted at
any time within five years after the date of its delivery to the

I
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State Treasurer. 'fhl! limitation provision docs not, however, distinguish bctween thn types of propnrty to be .. held"
by the State Treasurer; it refers to the "property so distnDuted, " which necessarily includes property to be delivered
to the State Treasurer as well as property not subject to or
'capable of manual delivery.
~~,: Respondents contend that certain language in Estate of
f Williams, 37 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [99 P.2d 349], involving
f'k estate probated before the adoption of section 1027, lends
;lupport to their position. It is asserted that since the pro; Visions of section 1027 are the same as the provisions of
:·.eotion 1269 of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as each
81rords the heirs five years within which to claim their
,'iDheritance, the dictum in that case interpreting section 1269
i'iS noW applicable to section 1027. The court stated: .. The
~~bution of the trust fund to the State was therefore in
""Dc; different category than any other distribution where no
'liairs are found, and parties entitled to succeed to the estate
"would have five years from the receipt of the money by the
'state in which to commence proceedings under section 1272a
-'of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Italics added.) It is to be
:noted, however, that the court held that since the state had
:lnotproceeded in accord with the requirements of section
;'1269, that section was inapplicable. It is evident, therefore,
:11I8t the court in the Williams case was not, as respondents
tii8sert, "construing the provisions of section 1269." Moreover,
~:court's dictum that a claimant "would have five years
~m the receipt of the money by the state" within which to
~dOmmence proceedings for the recovery thereof is erroneous,
Tali-'it had long been settled tbat a claimant's right to such
~rty could be asserted at any time, wben the state bad
'lioi-obtained a judgment of escheat pursuant to section 1269
'Of 'the Code of Civil Procedure. (Estate of Miner, 143 Cal.
lH' [76 P. 968] ; State v. Mt"ller, 149 Cal. 208 [85 P. 609];
~"cite of Griswold, 11 Cal.App.2d 89 [53 P.2d 192] ; Estate
.",Marlin,31 Cal.App.2d 680 [88 P.2d 755].)
f[;A.ppellants rely upon Estate of Lindquist, 25 CaUd 697
:r154 P.2d 879] and Estate of Walker, 25 Cal.2d 719 [154 P.2d
891], as controlling the issue here involved. In botb cases,
lh~, probate court decreed distribution of decedents' estates
~.ithe State of California pursuant to section 1027 of the
~bate Code, and df'nied the claim of the United Stlltes
Jihtunder a fedl'rlll statnte (43 Stahl. 613, 38 U.S.C. § 450.
" ••' 3) the estates should be distributed to it. On appeal,
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this court held in favor of the United States but rejected
·Ahc contention that title to the eRtates vested in it absolutely
upon entry of the decree of distribution. In each case it was
ordered that the court "amend its decree to provide that
'such residue [of decedent's e!'ltate J shall revert and be paid
to the United States of America upon elapse of five years
from Ike dale of di!itr&o'utiofl if the same has not theretofore
been claimed by any legal heir pursuant to the laws of Cali.
fornia." (Italics added.) (Estate of Lindquist, S1l-pra, 25 Cal.
2d 697, 712 [154 P.2d 879J ; Estate of Walker, supra, 25 Cal.
2d 719, 720.) Although, as respondents contend, the precise
question presented here was not before this court in the
foregoing cases, it is to be noted that it was necessary for
this court to interpret section 1027 of the Probate Code in
order to determine the exact date upon which title to the
estates would vest unconditionally in the federal government;
the effectiveness of that section to bar the right of a claimant
,!"ho has failed to present his claim within five years from the
date of the decree of distribution was recognized. The amendment to the decrees in those cases provided that the estate.~
"revert and be paid ... upon elapse of five years from tke
date of distnoution H (italics added), not from the date of
delivery of the property to the State Treasurer, as would
have been necessary were respondents' contention sound.
Respondents' final contention is that the "statutory construction contended for by appellants would result in the
anomalous conclusion that respondents had lost their right
before they ever had a remedy,H on the ground that section
1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the exclusive
remedy by which they could claim their inheritances after
distribution of the estate to the state and that under that
section the Superior Court of Sacramento County lacked
jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings, until the estate
had been "received by or deposited with the State Treasurer."
This construction, respondents assert, would be contrary to
the well-established rule that a statute of'limitation does not
commence to run until a cause of action has accrued. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 312; Feeney v. Hinckley, 134 Cal. 467, 470 [66
P. 580, 86 Am.St.Rep. 290]. Sec, 16 Cal.Jur. § 91, p. 488.)
'St:ction 1027, however, has at all times provided that the
Superior Court of Sacramento County shall have full and
exclusive juriqdiction to determine claims, such as respondents
as.~crt, during the period that the eRtate is "held by the State
Treasurer." The jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Sacra-
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;'~ mento County was, therefore, effective commencing with thl'
:" date of the decree herein, and respondents could h!lYe insti·
tuted these proceedings in that court despite the fact that
. 'the assets of the estate had not yet been delivered to the
t·( State Treasurer.
~~.. '. In effect, respondents' argument is that since section 1272&
r"provides that the Superior Oourt of Sacramento County shull
tf."have jurisdiction to determine claims to estates "when the
ttestate ... has been received by or deposited with the State
T.reasurer" (italics added), it repeals by implication the
"provision of section 1027 that ·that court shall have full aud
r 'eXclusive juriSdiction from the date of the decree of dis~; tribution.
.
~.:,;, [9] It is well established that the repeal of statutes by
!'implication is not .favored (see, 23 Ca~.Jur. § 84, p. 694) and
:rthat statutes relatIng to the same subJect are to be construed
~,together and harmonized if possible. (People v. Trieber, 28
'Cal.2d 657, 661 [171 P.2d 1] ; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Con·
i'struction, § 5201, p. 531.) [3] Section 1272a is inconsistf'nt
},;:,nth section 1027 only upon the supposition that the Legisla1.7ture intended thereby to limit the otherwise full and ex~:CIusive jurisdiction previously given to the Superior Court
t'T'of. Sacramento County by making it depend upon actual
"pOssession of the estate by the State Treasurer.
. f;' When section 1027 was enacted in 1933, section 1272a
,,:provided that the S',lpe~io~ C?U!t of Sacram~nto C~unty shall
~'have full and exclUSIve JurISdiction to determIne claIms "when
iihe estate . . . has been received by or deposited with the
I.~.:~. Treasurer purs'!anf fo section 1:37" of the Code of
..... . -Procedure.(Itali~ added.} Section 1737 was the pre. 'eursor of section 1148 of the Probate Code, which was adopted
~lii"1931 (Stats. 1931, p. 662) and until 1939 provided that
.J'county treasurer must pay into the state treasury, upon
~der of the court, .all money and effects .in his hands be~onging
, 0- an estate to which there were no heIrs or other claImants.
~·.rlt
was not until section 1272a was amended in 1939 (Stats.
I-!
i1~39, p. 1456) that the procedure outlined therein was made
.:$pticifically applicable to distributions pursuant to section
:'1027. The amendment substituted the words, "pursuant to
'it'distribution thereof to the State of California," for the
f.9oids, "pursuant to section 1148 of the Probate Code." Thi!;
'~mendment followed logically: and consistently from the
l.\hanges also made in 1939 to section 1027 and 1148 of the
( - Code. Section 1027, .. heretof.... pointed out, was
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amended to provide for delivery by the county treasurer of
all money and personal property in his posses."ion immediately
upon entry of the decree of distribution; section 1148 was
changcel to provide that "After a final settlement of the
estate, if there are no heirs or other penlons entitled thereto
• • . the county treasurer I>haU deliver to the State Treasurer
• . . aU money and other personal property in his hands belonging to the estate, at the time and in the manner provided
in section 1027 of this code. . . . " (Stats. 1939, p. 1447.)
Thus, although the amendments made in 1939 to the foregoing
sections effected a change in procedure so far as delivery of
money and personal property comprising an unclaimed estate
is concerned, there is no indication whatever that the Legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of the Superior Court
of Sacramento County solely to claims to property actually
delivered to the State Treasurer. The explicit provil'ion of
section 1027 that that court shall have full and exclusive
jurisdiction during the five-year period from the date of
the decree of distribution remained unchanged.
Judgment reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmond'l, J., Scbauer, J., anel Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
This case involves the construction of section 1272:1. of
the Code of Civil Procedure and section 1027 of the Probate
Code. I see no sound reason for the view· taken by the
majority of this court.
The portions of section 1027 of the Probate Code which are
here applicable read as follows:
"If the money or other personal property belonging to an
estate has· been deposited in the county treasury prior to
the date of distribution to the State of California, upon
the rendition of the decree of distribution, any money so distributed shall forthwith be delivered to the State Treasurer
by the county treasurer, and all other personal property so
distributed shall forthwith be delivered to the State Controller for deposit iD. the state treasury. . . .
"The properly '0 distnouted shall be held by Ihe State
Treas'"rer for a period of five year, from tke date of tke
decree making lUck distrib·"dio'll, within which time any per.;on
may appear in the 8up~rior court for the county of Sacramento
and claim the estate or any part thereof. • ••
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;;"Any person whll dul''' II lit app"ar and ,·Iaim, as I,,'rpjll
.' 'zoeQ.uired, t;hall h(' for('wr uut·.·(·t1,lIl1d SllI'h propprty, or so
',much thereof as is not claimed, shall vest absolutely in the
-

"

S~ati(lln

1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure, in part, is as

the estate, or any portion thereof, of any decedent
be'" received by or deposited with the State Treasurer
fiMlrlU;lIllr to II distri1Jutioll thereof to the State of California,
and, except as otherwise provided by law, when there
, the possession of the State or its officers any money or
property, real or personal, which is to be held for
persons or the title to which has vested in the State
~1uJ»jeet to the rights of third persons, the superior court of thc
(eiOon1ty of Sacramento, State of California, shall have fuU and
.U~dUslive jurisdiction to determine the title to the property
all claims thereto.
~ Any person entitled to succeed to the property or to take
thereto or possession thereof, and not a party or privy
iny proceedings had under any of the foregoing section!;
this title, may, unless otherwise barred, file a petition in
superior court of the county of Sacramento showing his
or right to the property, or the proceeds thereof, or to
portion thereof."
.. construction placed upon these portions of the code
~,M.f!ti.4)ns by the majority is an unnecessarily strict one, and one
~-'I'rn"",.rn.... I cannot, in good conscience, agree. The majority
~f\o'l;...... 'emphasis on the latter clause of a sentence contained
"""'" ....., ....u •
1027 of thl! Probate Code, and, in effect, ignore
first part of the same sentence. CCThe property so disf:~~buted shall be held by the State Treasurer for a period
!itJe years from the date of the decree making such distfJ'ibt.l:fiD'Il." (Emphasis added.)
But we also have another
E~.pll1'8lle to contend with: CCThe property so distributed shall be
by the State Treasurer for a period of five years from
date of the deeree making such distribution. . • ." Here
property was held by the county treasurer from somc
. prior to the decree which is dated May 6, 1940, until
turned over to the State Treasurer January 26, 1946.
whose relationship to the deceased is undisputed,
CIOImn,en4~ed these proceedings on February 13, 1946, less than
month after the State Treasurer had received the property.
~ority of this court reach the result that respondents
.&&
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are barred because the statute of limitation began to run from
the date of -the Mcree making such distribution.
This result is reached despite the provisions of section
1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure which outlines the
procedure which must be followed by any claimant seeking
to establish his relationship to a deceased person. That
section clearly states that "When the estate, or any portion
thereof, of any decedent has been received by or deposited
witk tli, Staf,7'reasurer pursuant to a distribution thereof
to the State of California, . • .' and, . . • when tkere " in
tke possession of the state or its officers any money or other
property, real or personal, which is to be held for third persons
or the title to which has vested in the state subject to the
rights of third persons, the. superior court of the county of
Sacramento, State of California, shall have full and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the title to the property and all
claims thereto. "
The majority opinion defines the word I I held" as embracin~
two meanings~ne, actual physical possession, and the other
as being invested with legal title or right to hold or claim
possession, and then says that clearly the Legislature must
have intended the latter meaning. This does not take into consideration the latter part of the same sentence which provides
that "when there is in the possessio1& of the state or its
officers _ .. etc." It seems to me that a far more plausible
construction would be that it was intended that the five-year
period was to run from the time the state obtained possession
pursuant to the decree of distribution. Construing the two
sections together, which is the usual, procedure, there is
nothing inconsistent and no "insertions" or "omissions" are.
required. The provision that, after the decree of distribution,
the money or property sh9uld be delivered "forthwith" to
the State Treasurer was undoubtedly meant to have a practical
e1fec~that the county treasurer should deliver the property
without delay, thus obviating such a state of affairs as existed
in this case.
.
The majority say that it can hardly be contended that "by
amending section 1027 [Prob. Code] in 1939 to require the
immediate delivery of certain estate assets, the u-gi$lature
intended to provide for a period of limitation ,1i1ferent from
that previously established, for t.he wording of the limitation
pruvision remained unchanged." I submit that in view of
tIll' l'ntirt' scction, it can be &0 ('ontt'DtlNl. Statutory nmf'mlWtlllts are usually illtenueu either to correct ambiguit.it'S ill the

)
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,'language or mt'anin~, or to ('arry the hlw a ~ep or two
farther. Why is it any less l't~a.'1ollablc to say that tbeL('gi.s1:lture intended that the money Hhould be delivcr\!d to the
• State TreasUrer as soon as was possible aftor thtl dc.:crec of
, distribution, 80 that the p<!riod of thp. statute would btgin
to run without delay t The evil which it wa.~ cnacted to correct
,,wus the practice of holding propl'rty of lIuch dccl'dl'nt~ in
county trcusury for long periods of time and the right
cl:rlm the funds became interminable. In 1933, section
(Prob. Code) was enacted as a new section providing
the
by the State Trelll'lUrer and the bar of a
,,{'.imlmt;·s right mnch BEl at present. But the prompt puy~._____ of the funds to the State Treasurer was not provided
ID. 1939, the section was amended to require the executor
administrntor of no estate to pay such fund" held by him
direetlLY into the state treasury, and further provided that
_'_WU'L:n, such funds wer~ already in the possession of the county.
county treasurer should pay them forthwith to· the State

.As WUtl pointed out by the learned trial judge when deciding
case, it would be uumifestly impracticable for a person, an
.. heir, who might be living in any part of the
to inquire from time to time of the various county
l'ea:surers throughout the state as to the presence, therein of
, ~ible estate he or she might inherit. He would knoW'
if any long lost relative of his had died the property
escheat to the state. Furthermore, this must have been
. , theory which prompted the Legislature to provide that his
':.L~'OJ1,· in the nature of a declaratory judgment settling title,
. , the state, not against any county in which the
may have been domiciled at the time of his death.
. appears to me that there is merit in respondent's conIlfm1<lOn that if appellant's position is sound, their cause of
EjimCl1n' is barred before it ever arose. Escheat statutes and
r"atllltes of limitation are statutes of forfeiture and should be
K'Jl1trictlv construed against the one asserting either, or both
the,m--lD this instance, the state. Since the statute provides
reslpo:nd~ent'8 exclusive remedy was one against the IItate,
1l'1.· .......·.,1.:1 seem that the provisions of section 1027 of the Probate
should be so construed as to make it harmonious with
1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure. In order to
,.} ,a just result; it w only necessary tbat these two "'-Co
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tions be construed together, liberally, in the light of the obvious
intentioll of the Lcgi:;laturc.
}'or the foregoing reasow; I would afilrm the judgmellt of
th(! trial court.
Shenk. J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March
24,1949. Shenk, J., and Oarter, J., voted for a rehearing.

